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Abstract: The extent to which the artist’s intentions are a relevant consideration
in the interpretation of art has long been the subject of critical debate. First, I
outline the various philosophical positions which have been established, specifically
focusing on the debate between hypothetical intentionalism and moderate actual
intentionalism. Then I look at some previous test cases which have, as yet, failed
to demonstrate a decisive victory for either side. Finally, I offer two new test cases,
one from the field of contemporary visual art and the other from literary theory. I
argue that the former serves to debunk hypothetical intentionalism and the latter
lends support to the moderate actual intentionalist position.
The extent to which the artist’s intentions are a relevant consideration in
the interpretation of art has long been the subject of critical debate. From
the intentionalist camp two prominent positions have emerged: hypothetical
intentionalism (HI) and moderate actual intentionalism (MAI). The prefix
‘moderate’ is added to distinguish it from the more radical position, absolute
actual intentionalism. Absolute actual intentionalism claims that the actual
intentions of the author are the only determining factor in the meaning of a
work, whereas MAI claims that only successful intention is meaning-shaping.
This is a subtly weaker claim. In contrast HI argues that our best-informed
hypothesis of the artist’s intentions is all that is required in the interpretation
of artworks.
What appears to be a subtle and innocuous distinction has in fact given
rise to impassioned debate. The reason for this is that both HI and MAI
agree, broadly speaking, on the basic criteria and nature of interpretation. In
most cases the methodologies that separate the two sides will not necessarily
yield different interpretive results. However, the key debating point between
the two concerns warranted hypothesis and truth.
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I. THE CURRENT DEBATE
In the field of aesthetic philosophy there are many interpretive positions one
might adopt. At one end of the spectrum we have the anti-intentionalism
which came to prominence in the mid-twentieth century. Anti-intentionalists
such as W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley do not accept that we should
interpret a complex object formed of both the work and the intentions of
the artist.1 They argue that conventions are all that is necessary for the
purposes of establishing work-meaning and so there is no reason to add an
arbitrary component like the intentions of the artist in order to form an in-
terpretation. This argument is predicated upon the idea that creative works
are autonomous objects and ultimately interpretive claims made should be
tested against the content of the work rather than any arbitrary external fea-
tures. Several powerful objections may be levelled against anti-intentionalism,
chiefly that it mischaracterises intentions as private inaccessible mental phe-
nomena, unconnected with the work and that convention alone is not suf-
ficient to establish work-meaning in many cases.2 One of the reasons there
is substantial debate in the field of interpretation is precisely because clear
meanings do not always present themselves immediately in creative works.
Appealing to conventional meaning or even word sequence meaning, the sort
we obtain from dictionaries, rules of grammar and linguistic conventions, will
not suffice for the purposes of interpretation because it fails to take identity-
relevant contextual factors into consideration. Instances of irony are often
cited to demonstrate this distinction because they depend, in part, on con-
text.3 To the superficial reader an ironic comment and an unironic comment
follow the same rules of grammar and linguistic conventions, however irony
expresses an agent’s meaning precisely by using language that normally sig-
nifies the opposite.
For those sympathetic to the anti-intentionalist cause, there is also the
value-maximisation theory. This theory has its origins in anti-intentionalism
but makes slightly different claims. The value-maximising theory claims that
the primary goal of any interpretation is to maximise the value of the work.
It is not always clear exactly what constitutes the optimal value of a work,
but so long as the interpretation conforms to some relevant interpretive cri-
teria and appears to be perceptive or revealing, then it could count as value-
maximising. Value-maximisation allows for a plurality of possible interpre-
tations to be acceptable simultaneously because there might be a number of
interpretations that give us an insight into the value of the work. This posi-
tion is more versatile than the anti-intentionalist position because it does not
exclude contextual factors that might be relevant when forming an interpre-
tation.
At the other end of the spectrum we have absolute actual intentionalism,
which believes that the meaning of a work is identical to the utterer’s mean-
ing. Utterer’s meaning refers to what was meant by the artist or author.4
Utterance meaning appreciates that a text requires interpretation because it
has a kind of autonomy. Within the coordinates of this debate it is defined
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as the meaning of a text used on a particular occasion. We are not trying to
defer as quickly to what the person meant in literary interpretation as we are
in conversation.5 As Beardsley has pointed out, a blue sculpture is not pink
just because the artist says it is.6 This kind of statement made by an artist
is known as ‘Humpty-Dumptyism’.7 Additionally, work-meaning cannot be
identical to utterer’s meaning because an artist can ‘fail to convey’ certain
meanings in their work.8
There is also extreme actual intentionalism. In the extreme version the
meaning of a work is determined by the intentions of the artist except when
these do not match the content of the work. In these cases, where the artist’s
intentions are incompatible with the content of the work, then the work is ren-
dered meaningless.9 However, the notion that works can be rendered mean-
ingless is largely unsatisfactory as a means of explanation and so two more
modest positions have emerged: hypothetical intentionalism (HI) and mod-
erate actual intentionalism (MAI).
HI and MAI prefer to think of work-meaning in terms of utterance mean-
ing. Whilst intuitively understanding an utterance requires consideration of
the speaker’s intentions, the value-maximisation theory endorses the utter-
ance model while denying that the intentions of the artist are necessarily
relevant. In MAI the artist’s stated intentions are not conclusive as they are
in absolute actual intentionalism. If the stated intentions appear to be disin-
genuous or are not supported by evidence in the work, then both HI and MAI
will disregard them or say that the artist has failed to realise her intention
in the work. Both camps also believe that the primary goal of interpretation
is to establish what the artist intended to convey through her work. For the
most part HI and MAI even agree on the appropriate methods and grounds
for conjecture about these intentions. The social, cultural or historical con-
text, the artist’s body of work and the genre are all on the table as well as
publicly available knowledge about the artist that might be relevant. HI and
MAI allow all of this information to be admissible in the interpretation of a
work of art.
A crucial point separating HI from MAI is that the former will not allow
private statements of intent made by the artist to count in the available body
of evidence. The main reason for this is that HIs believe the work should
be able to stand alone in so far as any meaning successfully conveyed should
be recoverable by reference to the work itself rather than pronouncements of
intent from the artist. HI’s dismissal of these semantic intentions is based
on the implicit contract between the artist and the audience which says it is
implausible to ask the interpreter to possess private information about the
author. If someone writes a novel, it is too much to demand the reader to know
personal things about the author in order to understand the work. As Jerrold
Levinson says, works should not ‘require artists to explain’ what they mean.10
For HI, only a fully informed and educated guess at the artist’s intended
meaning is necessary. In some variations of HI the audience projects these
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intentions onto an implied figure, which acts as an intermediary between the
work and the artist. The ‘implied figure’ is useful not least because it allows
us to assign and discuss the beliefs, attitudes and values of the artist without
referencing anything outside of the immediate content. The interpreter’s task
is ‘to surmise what a hypothetical author could have intended the work to
mean’.11 Most HIs stress that the best warranted hypothesis about the artist’s
intentions is the one that is most likely to be right given the structure of the
work and the relevant context. In cases where there are two equally sound
interpretations on offer HIs advocate for the interpretation which is most
favourable in an artistic sense.12
The implied author is not the only mechanism by which we might under-
stand HI. Levinson equivocates on this issue, but, in the end, argues for a
different conception of HI. He says that whilst this may be characteristic of
other HIs, it is not a fair reflection of his own beliefs. Levinson prefers that
his hypotheses relate to the actual author in so far as they ‘attempt to arrive
at what that author is most plausibly and charitably understood as meaning
via the text he or she has produced and put forward as a literary work’.13
In contrast, MAIs do not omit any relevant evidence such as the artist’s
pronouncements of intention, in attempting to establish the meaning of a
work.14 Whilst in most cases HI and MAI yield the same interpretative
results, this difference can sometimes lead to a disparity between the artist’s
stated intentions and the hypothesis of an informed audience. In cases where
such a disparity occurs, MAI will defend the interpretation consonant with
the artist’s stated intentions. Exceptions to this are instances where we have
reasons to believe that the artist’s stated intentions are insincere, unreliable
or more generally not supported by the text.
Often, critics assume that a thorough study of the work’s content, the
author’s biography, other works in the genre and any culturally relevant facts
will allow them to arrive at the artist’s intentions without needing accom-
panied statements by the artist. However, as Noël Carroll has pointed out,
whilst this is a prudent default position it should not be applied so stringently
as to rule out relevant evidence, such as the pronouncement of artistic inten-
tion, should such evidence present itself. This evidence would undoubtedly
be considered relevant to any complete interpretation and it does not violate
any rules of good interpretive practice.15
Whilst both MAI and HI agree that utterance meaning is a good model
for interpreting works of art, they don’t completely agree on what utterance
meaning actually is. For MAI, utterance meaning is determined by the artist’s
actual intentions as they are realised in the work.16 If the artist’s intentions
fail then meaning is determined by convention and context instead. For HI
the meaning of an utterance is the intended meaning attributed to the artist
by an informed audience. HI says the primary meaning of a work is syn-
onymous with the best-hypothesised intentions of the author given all the
appropriate reader data.17 Additionally, there has been some debate about
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whether artistic interpretation should remain methodologically distinct from
utterance interpretation. Intentionalists on both sides of the divide gener-
ally agree that if, in ordinary conversation a speaker’s utterance is unclear we
may ask them to clarify what they meant. Whether or not we can be afforded
the same luxury in relation to art is the point of departure. HI argues that
clarification from the artist should not be sought because the artwork does
not function like the utterance found in a conversation. Many proponents of
MAI believe that the work of art operates like the conversational utterance.
According to MAI the meaning of a work is that which is intended by
the artist and successfully conveyed. HIs usually object that 1) this requires
success standards to be available which do not rely on intention-based criteria.
These standards would allow us to establish objectively whether or not an
utterer has succeeded in conveying their intentions. 2) They also object that
moderate actual intentionalists such as Carroll face the accusation that it is
difficult to attribute certain intentions, states of mind or motivations to the
actual author with any real degree of certainty. The nature of art is such that
the artist might be trying to portray a certain image of herself through her
work, which need not necessarily be accurate. Instead, it would be prudent to
confine our attributions to the implied figure constructed as an intermediary
between the work and the audience.
In response to 1) both Gary Iseminger and Carroll set up success con-
ditions for establishing the artist’s actual intentions.18 They claim that the
meaning of an artistic utterance is decided by the artist’s actual intentions
in cases where they are justifiably supported by the content of the work
understood in the relevant context. In response to 2), Paul Taylor points
out that recognising the presence of natural meaning renders this argument
somewhat unconvincing.19 Since unconscious meaning and natural meaning
present themselves in the work without the awareness of the artist, we are
less likely to accept that the work is a completely artificial construction of an
artist trying to portray a carefully crafted image to the public. In the case of
natural meaning the artist does not intend to convey this kind of meaning and
in the case of unconscious meaning the artist is unaware that certain factors
have played a role in influencing her reasons for action. These ‘uncensored’
motivations and states of mind present themselves directly in the content of
the work and when we interpret them as such we are engaging with the actual
artist rather than the implied figure.20
HI has its problems too. Levinson argues that the meaning of a work
is our best-hypothesised intention having analysed all the information that
might be relevant to an audience. It is not clear exactly from Levinson’s writ-
ing what constitutes the appropriate information or indeed what constitutes
the appropriate audience. In some places he suggests that the appropriately
informed audience is an audience with the required knowledge to understand
the content of the work. At other times he argues ‘we may be guided in
identifying an appropriate audience . . . by certain norms and conventions un-
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derstood to define the sphere of literary production and reception’.21 This
second definition implies that we can generally establish the kind of evidence
that an appropriate audience might have at their disposal. This evidence
would include the artist’s œuvre, the genre of the work, linguistic and artistic
conventions of the culture, socio-political developments and other contextual
features that might be relevant or would have had an impact on the artist at
the time of composition.
Putting aside for a moment the circularity present in at least one of these
definitions, it is interesting that each definition could potentially yield differ-
ent interpretive results. In many cases it won’t matter which definition you
employ, but one could imagine cases where certain specialist knowledge was
required to properly understand and interpret the work. Rather than outline
every point of contention between the two sides, I will move on to examine
some test cases that have been used in the debate.
II. PREVIOUS TEST CASES
In his book Intention and Interpretation, Iseminger examines the opening
lines of a poem written by Gerard Manley Hopkins titled ‘Henry Purcell’.22
HAVE, fair fallen, O fair, fair have fallen, so dear
To me, so arch-especial a spirit as heaves in Henry Purcell,
An age is now since passed, since parted, with the reversal
Of the outward sentence low lays him, listed to a heresy, here.
According to Iseminger there are two possible interpretations of this verse
and both are legitimately attributable. He argues that if two are equally
legitimate then the one that is consonant with the artist’s intentions is the
one that is true.23 Referring to a letter Hopkin’s wrote, he argues that his use
of ‘fair fall’ in the poem is an economical rephrasing of ‘fair (fortune be) fall’.
In the letter, Hopkins is clearly concerned that an alternate reading might be
found. He writes,
One thing disquiets me: I meant ‘fair fall’ to mean fair (fortune
be) fall; it has since struck me that perhaps ‘fair’ is an adjective
proper and in the predicate and can only be used in cases like ‘fair
fall the day,’ that is, may the day fall, turn out, fair. My line will
yield a sense that way indeed, but I never meant it so.24
Iseminger argues that this pronouncement from Hopkins is necessary to
decide between two equally valid interpretations of the poem and proves that
moderate actual intentionalism is superior. However, Levinson disagrees,
arguing instead that a careful study of Hopkins’s rather unique style, often
employed in his poetic metre together with his well-documented admiration
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for Purcell and a desire to remain logically consistent with the rest of the
poem, makes this conclusion available to the audience without resorting to
consultation of the poet’s stated intentions.25
Hans Maes has suggested a different kind of test case, drawing on ex-
amples from the abstract visual arts rather than literary works.26 He offers
examples of contemporary visual art, which he argues would yield different
interpretive results when we include the direct pronouncements of intention
by the artist. One of these is an installation by the Italian artist Benedetto
Pietromarchi, which is part of the exhibition Reconstruction #1 (2002). The
work features two large light bulbs, lit and sat on platforms in the dungeons
of Sudeley Castle. Interviews with the artist reveal that the piece of art is
about childhood and the filaments, which burn bright within the bulbs, evoke
specific memories for the artist.
Maes argues that we will reach a different interpretive conclusion if we
do not consult the stated intentions of each artist. Therefore, according to
Maes, the artist’s remarks are decisive. Levinson’s appropriate and informed
audience would not have reached these conclusions using the publicly available
evidence alone. We do not usually associate large light bulbs, sat on stone
platforms in dungeons with childhood. Furthermore, there is nothing in his
background, biography or information made public at the show to suggest
that childhood had anything to do with the meaning behind Pietromarchi’s
installation.
In reply, Karen Gover argues that this example fails as a defining test
case in defence of MAI because it is an example of utterer’s meaning failing
to be realised in the work.27 Gover also says that this example fails because
works of contemporary visual art cannot realistically be considered utter-
ances. However, since she offers no alternative, I believe the responsibility
still lies with Gover to show how contemporary visual art can be construed
if not as an utterance.
Many more cases have been invoked in the field of literary theory from
The Turn of The Screw by Henry James to works by William Blake such as
Jerusalem.28 However, still no decisive test case has been put forward for
either position.
III. THE ART OF TOURETTE’S
Matt Sharp is a British artist who suffers from Tourette’s syndrome. This
neurodevelopmental disorder is characterised by both verbal and physical tics,
which tend to worsen over time. Sharp’s tics occasionally stop when he paints.
His tics became so violent that on one occasion he was paralysed from the
waist down and is now confined to a wheelchair. Some of his works are in a
Post-Impressionist style while some are more abstract. At times he uses vivid
colours to depict objects in life, but he often emphasises certain shapes while
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distorting form for expressive effect. Other times he seems to take abstract
forms and colours to convey an emotion or feeling. Below are two works by
Sharp, titled Two Faced (fig.1) and Three Boats (fig.2).
The earlier work depicts two faces beneath some rather aggressive black
lines. There are various plausible interpretations immediately supported by
contextual evidence. Knowing what we do about Sharp’s disability, the tragic
difficulties he faced in care and seeing other works of the same period executed
much more fluently and with brighter colours, HI may well conclude that the
lines are intentionally deployed and that the painting might be about the two
sides of his personality.29 Therefore, HI could interpret this as an attempt
to highlight the darker side of his illness. HI might argue that this work
represents a change in style and genre with a view to painting more concrete
objects. Yet, the view that the artist is referring to his illness seems uncalled
for. In a private conversation, Sharp pointed out that the scorched black lines
in the earlier painting Two Faced were a result of his tics jerking the pastels
around the canvas.30 Whilst the effects of Tourette’s can be intermittent
or temporarily suppressed, there are occasions when Sharp’s tics take over
during his painting and drawing. This was one of those occasions, but we
would not know this without the pronouncements of intent from the artist.
Sharp had also recently taken an interest in Picasso, whose works he identified
with and this was originally an attempt to pay homage to his style. This claim
certainly seems to be supported by the content of the work, as the picture is
reminiscent of Picasso’s cubist portraits, particularly The Weeping Woman.
We would expect that with his illness, the tics would grow worse over time,
therefore if the tics were causing the aggressive brush strokes they should
appear more apparent and exaggerated in his later works. However, in the
earlier work Two Faced these aggressive, abstract lines appear and in the
later work Three Boats they do not. Studying the work together with the
publicly available information and other works in the artist’s œuvre, would
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surely yield the conclusion that the thick black lines are intentionally used
for artistic effect. However, after speaking to the artist we find out that these
black lines are accidental and a result of the physical tics from his Tourette’s
syndrome. At this point the interpretation of HI becomes problematic because
we have no reason to believe that he was trying to convey some inner conflict
to the audience. HI should not simply prefer their own interpretation if doing
so would require interpreting unintentional features of the work as intentional
while we have clear evidence to suggest they are not. For HI the meaning
of a work is the intended meaning attributed to the artist by an informed
audience, but excluding avowals of intent on the grounds that they are not
publicly available means knowingly establishing an incorrect interpretation.
Whilst it is true that both HI and MAI agree that a feature does not have to
be intentionally created in order to have an intended effect, Sharp maintains
that he did not intend the work to have this effect on his audience. He is
adamant that he never intended for people to interpret this work as a piece
about his illness and he regrets that people read this into his work.
One possible reply from HI might be that while the lines were accidental
they were later intentionally sanctioned by the artist. Since Sharp decided
to continue painting in spite of the lines caused by his tics, he has built the
thick black lines into the work and sanctioned them in such a way that they
have become an interpretable feature. Sherri Irvin has discussed this matter
in her paper.
The artist’s sanction may serve to fix the boundaries of his or her
work, to determine whether a particular feature is relevant to the
work’s interpretation, [. . . ] in some cases to determine whether
it, qua artwork, has a particular feature or not.31
However, this reply gets HI no further forward because Irvin argues that
sanctioning gives the artist a ‘special authority’ on these matters.32 The
act of sanctioning might reinforce the idea that he is resilient and willing to
persevere in spite of his Tourette’s, but it does not legitimise the view that
this work is about the two sides to his personality or the depression associated
with his illness.
MAI is underpinned by the idea that intentions need to be successfully
realised in the work in order for them to be accepted in an interpretation.
This trait separates MAI from absolute intentionalism. In that sense, this
case cannot be a defence of MAI because unintentional actions, such as tics
caused by Tourette’s syndrome, cannot function as a way to endorse an in-
tentionalist theory of interpretation. However, what it demonstrates is that
HI is not always adequately equipped to arrive at accurate interpretations.
In cases such as these, the private avowals of intention are crucial to properly
understanding the content of the work.33
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IV. A LITERARY TEST CASE
Published in 1961, Richard Yates’s debut novel Revolutionary Road follows
the lives of Frank and April Wheeler in 1950’s suburban America. The Wheel-
ers are depressed by their surroundings and desperate to break out of their
suburban rut in search of a better life. Initially, the excitement and antic-
ipation reignites their romance but when April conceives a third child and
Frank is offered a promotion at work their plans begin to fall apart. Both
conducting affairs, overwhelmed by the situation and suffering from existen-
tial crises, their marriage breaks down. In a failed attempt to perform an
abortion on her child, April dies from blood loss and Frank is left distraught
and guilt-ridden.
Since publication, Yates has been widely regarded as a critic of Ameri-
can post-war suburban life. When Vintage Publishing reissued the book, it
chose to include in the blurb that the novel was an ‘evocative portrayal of
the opulent desolation of the American suburbs’.34 Comparisons have been
made with The Great Gatsby, partly because Yates was a fan of F. Scott
Fitzgerald. These comparisons suggest that both books should be read as
attacks on suburbia. Other critics such as Richard Price who described Yates
as a ‘master purveyor of the crushed suburban life’ and Christopher Hitchens
who praised his ability to ‘anatomise the ills and woes of suburbia’ have also
drawn an anti-suburban interpretation of the book.35 This classification may
in part have to do with the cultural context surrounding the novel at the
time of publication. Various other works such as Sloan Wilson’s The Man in
the Gray Flannel Suit were revered as attacks on the social backdrop, where
people battled against the system in search of purpose. In fact, when Yates
initially submitted the book to Little, Brown and Company it was rejected
for publication on the grounds that it ‘imitated’ Wilson’s earlier work.36
There are two possible interpretations, which seem wholly compatible with
the text and its themes:
i) Whilst suburban life is what they perceive to be the obstacle holding
them back from achieving their dreams, it is in fact Frank’s own fear, cow-
ardice and the fact that he is decidedly unremarkable that stops him from
moving to Paris and starting afresh.
ii) Whilst it is true that the Wheelers are acting cowardly and seem to
be blaming the suburbs for their own shortcomings, they have become ‘in-
stitutionalised’ by their socio-economic conditions and that conditioning is
fundamentally responsible for their cowardice. The suburban culture that
Yates seems to deride in his novel is in fact responsible for their failures and
the freedom to which they felt so close was only ever an illusion. They had
become like prisoners unable to liberate themselves.
In the absence of any direct pronouncements of intention from the author,
the second interpretation seems preferable for at least two reasons:
1) Specific passages and content suggest that suburbia is responsible for in-
stitutionalising the Wheelers beyond their control. Like the character Brooks
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in the film Shawshank Redemption, who cannot cope with the prospect of a
world outside because he has been institutionalised by prison, the Wheelers
have become institutionalised by suburban life.
Intelligent, thinking people could take things like this in their
stride, just as they took the larger absurdities of deadly dull jobs
in the city and deadly dull homes in the suburbs. Economic cir-
cumstances might force one to live in this environment, but the im-
portant thing was to keep themselves from being contaminated.37
‘Contaminated’ is an important word in this passage, as contamination
suggests exposure to sickness or poison which might affect us in ways we can-
not control. Yates seems to present Frank as this enlightened persona to make
the point that even being wise to the power of suburban malaise is not always
enough to liberate oneself from its grasp. As the book goes on there are sug-
gestions that this infection is starting to spread without Frank realising. At
one point Frank says, ‘Still, I don’t suppose one picture window is necessarily
going to destroy our personalities’.38 This quote seems deliberately dramatic
as though it is a warning to the reader of a man who has underestimated
the power of these seemingly innocuous details. One might sensibly conclude
from this that Yates wants us to see how even clever men can be victims of
circumstance, unable to properly fulfil their potential because of the social
and economic pressures. Yates’s other characters are in keeping with this
trend; trapped in ordinary lives they are desperate to escape.
Another continuity between Yates’s characters is their constant battle
against the culture in which they find themselves. It is not necessarily war
or the civil rights struggle that incites moral indignation for the characters,
but rather a sense of conformity that they find difficult to come to terms
with. On rare occasions Yates himself expresses political indignation, but
this is not the same as the existential struggles of his characters. In his
later work Young Hearts Crying, Yates comes as close to making a political
statement as he does in any of his work when the characters find themselves
discussing the Vietnam War. Davenport, who is a teacher in Kansas, and
his wife Sarah are due to hold a party and they are dreading the hoards of
anti-war protesters who usually turned up to these events. Terry Ryan, an old
friend of Davenport attends the party on his way through to fight in Vietnam.
Whilst he is there another guest named Grace asks him why he wants to kill
people abroad. He plays down the remark respectfully and moves on with
the conversation. The following day Davenport and Sarah drive Terry to the
airport and en route he refers to Vietnam as the ‘war that nobody would ever
understand’.39 Later that day Grace’s husband rings Davenport to complain
that Terry was unpleasant to Grace. This sequence of events is particularly
interesting as Yates shows that the pernicious lies and attacks of Grace are
not borne out of moral outrage but rather follow the trendy opposition to the
Vietnam war at the time.40 Yates’s own political statement comes through
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in his insistence that we should not blame the soldier for war, a sentiment
reiterated in the short story Jody Rolled the Bones and A Special Providence.
Instead we should focus on the structures that govern our lives and inhibit
individual freedom.
Returning to the text, this criticism of the suburban structures that con-
trol their lives seems to be reinforced when Mrs Givings brings her son John
to the Wheeler’s house for lunch. John is described in the book as insane,
but actually he is a brutally honest character who condemns his mother’s ba-
nal suburban lifestyle at the dinner table. The Wheelers feel uncomfortable
with these comments because they recognise in their own lives many of the
dull suburban traits John is criticising. John’s characterisation of insanity
could be interpreted ironically, as he is the only person able to see sense in
an otherwise dull existence.
2) Biographical evidence at the time of writing would have influenced
Yates’s opinions and beliefs about themes such as marriage. It is well known
that his fiction was largely autobiographical in nature. Indeed a lot of his
work included true events from his life. In addition, we cannot help but draw
timeline parallels between Yates’s life and the lives of his characters. Yates
was born in 1926, making him 17 in 1943, the same age as William Grove
in A Good School. He was 29 in 1955, as was Frank Wheeler in Revolutionary
Road. Finally he was 36 in 1962, the age of Emily Grimes in The Easter
Parade.
Revolutionary Road was published in 1961 and Yates got divorced just two
years before in 1959. This would definitely have had an impact on his writing
about marriage. The very fact that confusion was caused in the interpretation
of his writing on this subject is indicative of internal conflict with respect to
his views on marriage.
There are various reasons to believe that Revolutionary Road is a political
attack on the system, even the title of the work suggests this. Politically,
Yates identified as a ‘liberal’ and in America liberalism is associated with the
welfare-state policies from the New Deal and the Democratic administration
of President Roosevelt.41 Libertarianism has since taken up the defence of
laissez-faire capitalism and unlike in Britain, the term ‘liberal’ in the United
States refers to Social Liberalism. In any case American liberal values are
thought to generally support equality and liberty. These political values sup-
port the idea that freedom of the individual is of central importance. Indeed,
Yates represents the socio-economic conditions of 1950s suburban America
as restricting the Wheelers’s individual liberties. Richard Yates was also the
speechwriter for attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy who was a prominent
member of the Democratic Party.
HI could easily have formed the opinion, as many critics did, that the book
was an attack on marriage and suburban America in the 1950s. However,
Yates was interviewed later and insisted that whilst the Wheelers blamed the
suburbs for their problems, it was in fact their own shortcomings that were
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to blame. In the case of Frank Wheeler, Yates never meant for us to identify
with him as a character, but rather wanted us to realise that Frank was an
unexceptional man, a hopeless romantic who was a victim of his own pride
and arrogance.
In an interview Yates was asked why he ‘lambasted the suburbs’. Yates
replied,
I didn’t mean to. The book was widely read as an anti-suburban
novel, and that disappointed me. The Wheelers may have thought
the suburbs were to blame for all their problems, but I meant it
to be implicit in the text that that was their delusion.42
As we have discussed, the book is also said to have been an attack on marriage:
[Interviewer]: You weren’t knocking marriage?
Oh, of course not. That’s another false interpretation too many
people put on the book.43
Yates blames Alfred Kazin, at least in part for this misinterpretation; how-
ever, Kazin was only doing what any astute reader would and attending to
Yates’s commentary on marriage as it stands alone in the work. Furthermore,
Kazin’s commentary was included on the cover of the final publication of the
book so it would be quite reasonable or understandable for HI to believe that
these views were in accordance with those of the author.
The content to which I have referred could and should be interpreted
differently in light of Yates’s interview. Yates says that his intentions were
not to attack suburban life or indeed the institution of marriage, but without
his pronouncements of intent we would not necessarily draw this conclusion
from the text, publicly available and relevant biographical information or
other writings in his œuvre. Yates’s commentary contextualises his work such
that we can see that Frank’s character is motivated by, and grounded in, his
vanity and a delusional stylised conception of himself as an anti-suburban
intellectual. If we read the text in light of Yates’s interview we can clearly
see that he was trying to show Frank’s inadequacies. For instance, when
John quizzes him about his job at Knox Business Machines, he replies, ‘[I]
sort of help sell them, I guess. I don’t really have much to do with the
machines themselves; I work in the office. Actually it’s a sort of stupid job.
I mean there’s nothing – you know, interesting about it, or anything’.44 The
inarticulate stumbling response and the explanation of his menial job should
alert the reader to the fact that Frank is an unremarkable man. A man who
commits adultery, who insults Norma Townsend by calling her a lesbian and
is totally lacking in qualities such as courage or wisdom.
Provided that HI accepts the reasonable suggestion that we are not usually
mistaken about our intentions and accepts that the claims made by the artist
are sufficiently supported by the work, then it seems curious to argue that
these claims are not a relevant consideration when interpreting their work.
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HI does allow for pronouncements made by the artist to be admissible
provided these pronouncements are publicly available. In reply, HI might
claim this does not constitute publicly available information. However, HI
does not always adequately distinguish between public and private informa-
tion. According to Levinson, the relevant public context admissible should
be construed as that which the artist wanted the audience to know about his
intentions. He says if information that had been deliberately concealed later
came to light it still does not constitute admissible information from public
context.45 However, Yates never tried to conceal anything about his inten-
tions, indeed he thought his intentions were made clear in his writing. After
all, his corroborating statements of intent published later are wholly compat-
ible with an interpretation of his work. It seems curious for HI to hold on to
their hypothesis when newly discovered evidence shows it to be patently false.
Furthermore, in order for HI to hold onto the original anti-suburban inter-
pretation, HI has to actively deny that the interpretation consonant with the
author’s pronouncements of intent is correct. This would seem a very curious
position given that both interpretations seemed to be plausible prior to the
statements of intent from the artist. In light of these pronouncements from
Yates it becomes somewhat arbitrary to leave out some publicly available,
yet epistemologically relevant evidence for HI’s preferred interpretation.
On the other hand, HI might argue that now this interview has been
published it is part of the publicly available body of information and so HI can
logically reach the same conclusion as MAI. However, this creates a different
problem. Hypothetically we can conceive of a case where a hypothetical
intentionalist, Person A, has access to some private statements of intent made
by the artist and those statements are not in the public domain and, were they
to be admissible, would clearly change our perception of the work. Person
A cannot include knowledge of those statements in an interpretation of the
creative work. Later these statements are published or made public and now
these statements are admissible for Person A to include in their body of
epistemically relevant information. In both cases, Person A had access to the
same information but their interpretation was different because, in the first
instance, Person A would not allow herself to include the private statements
made by the artist. In this case Person A’s decision to exclude information
she already has at one juncture, but include it at another, seems arbitrary
and irrational.
A final concern with this case study might lie with the distinction between
semantic and categorial intentions. To quote Jerrold Levinson, ‘an author’s
intention to mean something in or by a text T (a semantic intention) is one
thing, while an author’s intention that T be classified, taken, approached in
some specific or general way (categorial intention) is quite another’.46 This
distinction is relevant because HIs tend to be more liberal when it comes
to categorial intentions. HIs could also arguably allow much more room for
direct authorial statements in interpreting the categorial intentions – that is
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how the artist has intended the work to be taken as a whole. In fact, the
interviews reveal that the intentions Yates had with regard to Revolutionary
Road seem to be largely categorial, in the sense that they show how Yates
thought the novel should be understood as a whole. If this is indeed the
case, then HI might be able to give Yates’s statements about his categorial
intentions the kind of role I have argued is not within reach of HI.
However, the distinction between semantic intentions and categorical in-
tentions is not so clear in this case. There are specific references in this same
interview with Yates to his semantic intentions in the text. For instance,
the interviewer suggests that the title is an attack on suburban life, to which
Yates replies, ‘I meant the title to suggest that the revolutionary road of 1776
had come to something very much like a dead end in the fifties’.47 This would
be a case of mixed intention without two significantly distinct aims.48 Here
HI has to establish whether the semantic portion cancels out the intention
and there does not seem to be a clear basis for making this decision. This
would lead to an ambiguous interpretation of the novel, which would not be
satisfactory for either camp, since HI would be conceding that the ambiguity
was in some sense intentional and so the interpretations of HI and MAI would
not converge.
When we are faced with a number of possible interpretations for a given
work, the pronouncements of intention from the author are often a decisive
factor in establishing which interpretation is legitimate. I believe that both
the contemporary visual art of Matt Sharp and the novel Revolutionary Road
by Richard Yates offer clear cases where the private statements of the artist
are epistemically relevant to interpretation of their work. Deliberately ex-
cluding this information is arbitrary and will lead to faulty interpretations.
fth5@kent.ac.uk
NOTES
1Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946.









11Stephen Davies 2006, 223.
12Maes 2010.
13Levinson 2017, 148.
14Richard Wollheim 1980, 185 argues
that criticism requires the retrieval of the
creative process: ‘The task of criticism is
the reconstruction of the creative process,
where the creative process must in term
be thought of as something not stopping
short of, but terminating on, the work
of art itself. The creative process recon-
structed, or retrieval complete, the work is


















29George, Sarah. ‘Letherhead care home
tells paralysed artist he can no longer paint
because he might hurt himself’, Surrey
Live (online) 18th October 2017. This ar-
ticle documents alleged abuse from Sharp’s
carers and cites that he was no longer al-
lowed to paint in the art room because it
had a beam and the carers were concerned





33Taken from an unfinished transcrip-
tion of the interview: [FH]: Why did
you choose to keep the lines in rather
than painting over them or starting again?
[MS]: I kind of liked the effect, even though
I didn’t mean to do it. It seemed to give
the picture depth.
34Yates 2007, ix.







42Clark and Henry 2011, 208.




47Clark and Henry 2011, 208-209.
48Livingston 1998, 842.
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